Peter S. Onwe, PhD
Department of Social Science
School of General Studies
Federal Polytechnic Nekede, Owerri


Abstract
This paper probes into the Plausibility of the Thesis that Process Metaphysics rescues
Metaphysics from the onslaught of Analytic Philosophy. Analytic philosophy is used to
describe philosophy that proceeds through analysis broadly, by seeking to understand the
composition of its subject matter out of simple components. Analytic metaphysicians generally
take as little interest in what goes by the name ‘metaphysics’ in non-analytic circles as they do
in the ‘metaphysics’ found in New age bookstores. Generally, there is a great gulf fixed
between analytic philosophers and other philosophers, including non-analytic metaphysicians.
Process philosophy is based on the premise that being is dynamic and that the dynamic nature
of being should be the primary focus of any comprehensive philosophical account of reality
and our place within it. The concern of process philosophy is with the dynamic sense of being
as becoming or occurance, the conditions of spatio-temporal existence, the kinds of dynamic
entities, the relationship between mind and world, and the realization of values in action.
Process Metaphysics elaborated in process and reality posits ‘an ontology which is based on
the two kinds of existence of entity, that of actual entity and that of abstract entity or
abstraction’. Process philosophy is best described as a paradigm of philosophy characterized
by a set of more fundamental assumptions. This paper using critical evaluation submits that
analytic philosophy objected metaphysics in a way and on the other hand defended it. Process
metaphysics was able to tackle the short comings of metaphysics which made analytic
philosophers reject it.
Keywords: Analytic Philosophy, Process Metaphysics, Metaphysics, Actual Entity,
Philosophy
Introduction
Metaphysics as it is currently practiced in the English-speaking world, is a heterogeneous
discipline, comprising a wide variety of philosophical questions and methods of answering
them. However, our concern here is analytic and process approach to metaphysics. There is a
divide between groups of contemporary metaphysicians. Metaphysicians of the Englishspeaking academy line up on one side or another of a supposed “analytic/non-analytic” divide.
Many contemporary metaphysicians belong to movements that broke away during the first half
of the last century from what passed at that time, for “analytic philosopphy”. For many in these
movements, “analytic” became a dirty word, and “analytic metaphysics” practically a
contradiction in terms. Call philosophers in these circles “non-analytic metaphysicians”.
Logos: African Journal of Philosophy and Studies. Vol. 6, 2023
http://www.africanjournalofphilosophy.com
2
“Paradigmatic non-analytic metaphysical movements include process philosophers, neoThomists, personalists, some phenomenologists, neo-Platonists, some types of idealist and a
few Hegel-inspired but non-idealist system builders”1
. Non-analytic metaphysicians of all
varieties usually characterize “analytic philosophy” as fundamentally hostile to the deeper
questions of metaphysics.
Analytic metaphysicians generally take as little interest in what goes by the name
“metaphysics” in non-analytic circles as they do in the “metaphysics” found in New age
bookstores. Non-analytic metaphysicians repay the compliment, since they tend to think of
analytic philosophy construed broadly so as to include the work of both analytic and new wave
metaphysicians as inherently anti-metaphysical. More generally, there is a great gulf fixed
between analytic philosophers and other philosophers, including non-analytic metaphysicians.
Analytic Philosophy
Analytic philosophy in its primary sense is used to describe philosophy that proceeds via
analysis broadly, by seeking to understand the composition of its subject matter (or concepts
of that subject matter) out of simple (or simpler) components. In a prominent but secondary
sense, analytic philosophy applies to most philosophy carried out in the mainstream of AngloAmerican university philosophy deparments together with philosophy that bears a suitable
family resemblance to it – work within the analytic tradition.
The word “analytic” is associated, in some people’s mind, with the doctrine that most
traditional philosophical problems, including all the metaphysical ones, are pseudo-problems
arising from misunderstanding about how words work; that philosophical problems can all be
solved (or dissolved) by some sort of purely linguistic investigation. It should not be forgotten
that, when it first used to describe the philosophical movement that begins with Frege, Russell,
Moore, and Wittgenstein, the expression “analytic philosophy” did not carry these
connotations. And its extension today includes mainly philosophers who reject general
deflationary attitudes toward metaphysics. It was on Russell’s lips that “analysis” became, first,
a rallying cry in the revolt against idealism; and then the name of the whole movement spawned
by the revolt.
Today, once again, the label “analytic” has no anti-metaphysical implications or, at least, it
shouldn’t, given its actual extension. Most contemporary philosophers in the analytic camp
reject blanket dismissals of traditional metaphysical problems, and recognize that
Logos: African Journal of Philosophy and Studies. Vol. 6, 2023
http://www.africanjournalofphilosophy.com
3
“philosophical analysis” inevitably involves much more than simply unpacking the meanings
of ordinary words and idioms. There was a period when many analytic philosophers perhaps
even the majority believed that the problems of metaphysics were either demonstrably
meaningless, or resolvable by the clarification of terms or the recitation of platitudes “in a
plonking tone of vioce”2
.
The only definitions of “analytic philosophy” that come close to tracking actual application of
the term (in the broadest use) are ones that appeal to historical connections and selfidentification. Consider A. P. Martinich’s counterfactual criterion, which comes as close to
accuracy as any proposal seen: analytic philosophers are those who “would have done
philosophy the way Moore, Russell, and Wittgenstein were”3
.
Across the channel, a group of mathematicians, scientists, and philosophers formed a group in
Vienna in the 1920’s describing themselves as logical positivists and known as Vienna Circle.
Their orientation was rigorously empirical, and they proceeded to reject the whole of enterprise
of metaphysics. “Their ideal for philosophy was the unification of the sciences, hoping thereby
to produce a unified system of meaningful and valid knowledge”4
. A young former student of
Bertrand Russell’s Ludwig Wittgenstein, lived nearby, and though he was not a member of the
circle, he had conversations with them, since his early book, Tractatus logico-philosophicus
(1919), was considered by the Vienna Circle to express its philosophical point of view with
great accuracy. Not only had Wittgenstein said that “whatever can be said at all can be said
clearly”5
, he concluded his book by saying that “whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must
be silent”6
. This dictum was less harsh than Hume’s rigorous conclusion in his Enquiry, where,
following the implicit logic of his principles of empiricism, he wrote:
when we run over libraries, persuaded of these principles, what havoc must
we make? If we take in our hand any volume; of divinity or school
metaphysics, for instance let us ask, Does it contain any abstract reasoning
concerning quantity or number? No. Does it contain any experimental
reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence? No. Commit then to the
flames: for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion7
.
The Vienna Circle thought of themselves as the twentieth century heir of Hume’s empirical
tradition. To this tradition they now sought to apply the rigorous apparatus of mathematics and
science.
In the very late 19th century, Moore began a revolt against German Idealism. There were four
main sources of dissent. First, Moore felt that Idealism according to which mind and world are
Logos: African Journal of Philosophy and Studies. Vol. 6, 2023
http://www.africanjournalofphilosophy.com
4
interdependent was an erroneous metaphysical view and that, where possible, there should be
a return to Realism according to which there is an external world that is constituted
independently of operations of mind (except, of course, where the external world contains
individual minds). Second, he felt that the urge to grant system building should be suppressed
in favour of careful attention to detail and rigorous argumentation. Third, and related, he
objected to what he saw as unnecessary obfuscation in the writings of German Idealists. He felt
that philosophical theories and arguments for those theories should be open to objective
assessment and so should be stated as clearly and sharply as possible. The first three sources
of dissent were based upon an unfavourable comparison of the major philosophical work of the
period with work in the sciences. In Moore’s view, these more successful cognitive practices
should serve as a model for a better philosophical methodology. The same motivations were at
work in the fourth source of moore’s dissent, his negative reaction to the Idealist suppression
of the method of analysis. Calling for return to the method, Moore wrote that “… a thing
becomes intelligible first when it is analysed into its constituent concepts”8
.
Inspired by Moore, and enamoured in particular by the science of mathematics, Russell began
systematically to develop the programme of analysis. He was helped by his discovery of
modern quantificational logic. This logic enables the systematic treatment of the inferential
behaviour of a very large range of the statements that can be made in natural language (and so
the thoughts expressible by the use of those statements) as well as the sharp statement of
complex positions and arguments. A proposition or statement is either true or false. Using
symbolic notations, a true proposition can be called P and a false proposition not-P. A
molecular proposition consists of two or more atomic propositions (p, q, and so on) linked
together with logical connectives, such as and and or. For Russell atomic proposition is true
when its subject refers to something and the characteristics of the predicates are true of the
subject.
Russell’s treatment of definite descriptions showed that philosophical progress could be made
by discerning the (or a) logical form of a philosophically problematic range of statements and
that some philosophical disputes are usefully viewed as (at least in part) concerning how best
to represent the logical forms of statements involved in those disputes.
Together with the new treatment of quantification more generally, became a
model for a variety of approaches to philosophical problems that involved
attention to the forms of language used in the statement of those problems.
For it supported the view that philosophical problems can arise due to the
misleading superficial forms of the language we use and provided a model
Logos: African Journal of Philosophy and Studies. Vol. 6, 2023
http://www.africanjournalofphilosophy.com
5
for how problems that arise in that way might be solved through uncovering
the true logical forms of the statements involved.9

Wittgenstein further developed the analysis of statements, and of representation more
generally, in the direction of logical atomism. According to logical atomism, the most
fundamental level of representation involves point-by-point connections between simple
representational elements – representational atoms and simple represented elements –
represented atoms. This paradigm of analysis which bears comparison with aspects of Plato’s
Theaetetus was driven by the view that “A proposition (i.e. the content of a statement) has one
and only one complete analysis”10
. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus’ major conclusion was that
there are two types of statement: those that represent the world, and so can be either true or
false depending upon how the world in fact is – the synthetic truths and falsehoods – and those
that either cannot be true or cannot be false – the logical or analytic truths and falsehoods – that
fail to represent the world as being one way or another. Since genuinely philosophical
statements, derived by analysis, were taken to fall on the non – representational (analytic) side
of this divide, they were taken to be devoid of real content and to have a role other than that of
conveying information. “And since a core sense of meaningfulness was identified with
representational significance, such statements were taken to be in that core sense
meaningless”11
.
Members of the Vienna Circle including especially Rudolf Carnap were inspired by
Wittgenstein’s work and sought to embed its central themes in an approach to philosophy –
logical positivism – shaped by epistemological concerns. They replaced Wittgenstein’s
distinction between statements whose truth-value depends upon worldly contingency with a
distinction between statements that admit of verification or falsification on the basis of
experience and statements that cannot be so verified or falsified. The task of philosophy was
taken to be the analysis of statements into experientially significant components, an analysis
that would either indicate precisely the course of experience that would verify or falsify the
statement or show it to be beyond verification of falsificaton. In that way, philosophy would
either show how a statement can be assessed on the basis of scientific observation, or show the
statement to be (in the Circle’s propriatary sense) meaningless. Since the only properly
cognitive activity was taken to be the collection of observations, the programme of the Vienna
Circle was shaped by the view that “ what is left over for philosophy … is only a method: the
method of logical analysis”12
.
Logos: African Journal of Philosophy and Studies. Vol. 6, 2023
http://www.africanjournalofphilosophy.com
6
During the early post 1945 period, many philosophers retained the Vienna Circle’s animus
towards traditional metaphysics but viewed its approach to analysis as overly restrictive. They
sought to replace what they saw as an empirically unmotivated fixation upon a very narrow
conception of empirical content with a more expensive view of philosophical analysis.
According to the more expansive view, the analysis of statements was to include the tracing of
their roles within larger systems of language driven by careful attention to the way those
statements are actually used in ordinary contexts.
Process Metaphysics
Process philosophy is based on the premise that being is dynamic and that the dynamic nature
of being should be the primary focus of any comprehensive philosophical account of reality
and our place within it. Process philosophy (or ontology of becoming) identifies metaphysical
reality with change and development. Even though we experience our world and ourselves as
continuously changing, Western metaphysics has long been obsessed with describing reality as
an assembly of static individuals whose dynamic features are either taken to be mere
appearances or ontologically secondary and derivative. Since the time of Plato and Aristotle,
philosophers have posited true reality as “timeless”, based on permanent substances, while
processes are denied or subordinated to timeless substances. If Socrates changes, becoming
sick, Socrates is still the same (the substance of Socrates being the same), and change (his
sickness) only glides over his substance: change is accidental, whereas the substance is
essential. Therefore, “classic ontology denies any full reality to change, which is conceived as
only accidental and not essential. This classical ontology is what made knowledge and a theory
of knowledge possible, as it was thought that a science of something in becoming was an
impossible feat to achieve”13
.
In opposition to the classical model of change as accidental (as by Aristotle) or illusory, process
philosophy regards change as the cornerstone of reality – the cornerstone of the Being though
as Becoming. In physics Ilya Prigogine distinguishes between the “physics of being” and
“physics of becoming”14. “Process philosophy covers not just scientific intuitions and
experiences, but can be used as a conceptual bridge to facilitate discussions among religion,
philosophy, and science”15
.
Process philosophy has full systematic scope: its concern is with the dynamic sense of being
as becoming or occurence, the conditions of spatio-temporal existence, the kinds of dynamic
entities, the relationship between mind and world, and the realization of values in action. Some
Logos: African Journal of Philosophy and Studies. Vol. 6, 2023
http://www.africanjournalofphilosophy.com
7
approaches to process philosophy are conceived on the grand scale and offer a full-scope
metaphysics in the form of a systematic theory or comprehensive philosophical view. Other
approaches, especially more recent ones, take a more modest approach.
Process philosophy share the guiding idea that natural existence consists in modes of becoming
and types of occurrences. ‘Processists’ agree that the world is an assembly of physical, organic,
social, and cognitive processes that interact at and across levels of dynamic organization.
However, within that broad framework, process philosophers debate about how such a world
of processes is to be construed, how it relates to the human mind (which is another process)
and how the dynamic nature of reality relates to our scientific theories. In consequence, process
philosopher also differ in their view on the role of philosophy itself and in their choice of
theoritical style.
In early 20th century philosophy of mathematics, it was undertaken to develop mathematics as
an airtight axiomatic system, in which every truth could be derived logically from a set of
axioms. In the foundations of mathematics, this project is variously understood as logicism or
as part of the formalist programme of David Hillbert.
Process thought describes truth as “movement” in and through determinates (Hegelian truth),
rather than describing these determinates as fixed concepts or “things” (Aristotelian truth).
Since Whitehead, process thought is distinguished from Hegel in that it describes entities which
arise or coalesce in becoming rather than being simply dialectically determined from prior
posited determinates. These entities are refered to as complexes of occasions of experience. It
is also distinguished in being not necessarily conflictual or oppositional in operation.
The process metaphysics elaborated in process and reality posits “an ontology which is based
on the two kinds of existence of entity, that of actual entity and that of abstract entity or
abstraction”16. “Actual entity is a term coined by Whitehead to show the basic realities that
shape all things”17. Actual entities are clusters of events that shape reality. Actual entities do
not discuss the substance of anything but talk about how something is happening. “The universe
is a case based on a series of actual entities intermingled with one another”18
.
The ultimate abstract principle of actual existence for Whitehead is creativity. Creativity is a
term coined by Whitehead to show a force in the universe that allow the presence of actual
entity, others actual entities. Creativity is the principle of novelty. It is manifest in what can be
called ‘singular casuality’. This term may be contrasted with the term ‘nomic casuality’. An
Logos: African Journal of Philosophy and Studies. Vol. 6, 2023
http://www.africanjournalofphilosophy.com
8
example of singular causation is that I woke this morning because my alarm clock rang. An
example of nomic causation is that alarm clocks generally wake poeple in the morning.
Aristotle recognizes singular causality as efficient causality. For Whitehead, there are many
contributory singular cause of causes for an event. A further contibutory singular cause of my
being awoken by my alarm clock this morning was that I was lying asleep near it till it rang.
An actual entity is a general philosophical term for an utterly determinate and completely
concrete individual particular of the actually existing world or universe of changeable entities
considered in terms of singular causality, about which categorical statements can be made.
Whitehead’s most far-reaching and profound and radical contribution to metaphysics is his
invention of a better way of choosing the actual entities. Whitehead chooses a way of defining
the actual entities that makes them all alike, qua actual entities, with a single exception. For
example, for Aristotle, the actual entities were the substances, such as Socrates. Besides
Aristotle’s ontology of substances, another example of an ontology that posits actual entities is
the monads of Leibniz, which are said to be ‘windowless’.
Whitehead’s Actual Entity
For him, the actual entities exist as the only foundational elements of reality. The actual entities
are two kinds, temporal and atemporal. With one exception, all actual entities for Whitehead
are temporal and are occasions of experience (which are not to be confused with
consciousness). An entity that people commonly think of as a simple concrete object, or that
Aristotle would think of as a substance, is, in this ontology, considered to be a composite of
indefinitely many occasions of experience. A human being is thus composed of indefinitely
many occasions of experience.
The one exceptional actual entity is at once both temporal and atemporal: God. He is
objectively immortal, as well as being immanent in the world. He is objectified in each
temporal actual entity; but He is not an eternal object. Process philosophy, for some, gives God
a special place in the universe of occasions of experience. God encompasses all the other
occasions of experience but also transcends them, thus Whitehead embraces panentheism.
Since, it is argued, free will is inherent to the nature of the universe, God is not omnipotent in
Whitehead’s metaphysics. God’s role is to offer enhanced occasions of experience. God
participates in the evolution of the universe by offering possibilities, which may be accepted
or rejected.
Logos: African Journal of Philosophy and Studies. Vol. 6, 2023
http://www.africanjournalofphilosophy.com
9
The task of Process Metaphysics
Process philosophy is a complex and highly diversified field that is not tied to any school,
method, position, or even paradigmatic notion of process. In short “process philosophy is best
understood as a paradigm of philosophy characterized by a set of more fundamental
assumptions”19. For example, process philosophers assume that the only primary or basic
ontological categories should be terms for occuring entities, and that certain formal theories for
example, set theory are ill-suited of themselves, without modifications, to express the dynamic
relationships among occurences.
Given its current role as a rival to the dominant substance geared paradigm of western
metaphysics, process philosophy has the overarching task of establishing the following three
claims:
(i) The basic assumptions of the ‘substance paradigm’ (i.e., a metaphysics based on
static entities such as substances, objects, states of affairs, or instantaneous stages)
are dispensable theoretical presuppositions rather than laws of thought.
(ii) Process-based theories perform just as well or better than substance-based theories
in application to the familiar philosophical topics identified within the substance
paradigm.
(iii) There are other important philosophical topics that can only be addressed within a
process metaphysics.
Evaluation and Conclusion
The analysis of our key problems has placed us in a better position to judge or know whether
process metaphysics actually rescued metaphysics from analytic philosophy. The question is
why do people particularly non-analytic philosophers and scholars in other disciplines regard
“analytic philosophy” as hostile, in principle, to the traditional problems of metaphysics? Those
who think that anti-metaphysical doctrines are among the defining features of analytic
philosophy are mistaking the movement as a whole for the forms it took during the middle third
of the last century – a period during which many philosophers in the United States and nearly
all of most influential philosophers in England were under an anti-metaphysical spell of one
sort or another.
For over twenty five years since after 1935 – the year of Carnap’s Philosophy and Logical
Syntax, philosophy was dominated by movements opposed to the very idea of metaphysics:
Logos: African Journal of Philosophy and Studies. Vol. 6, 2023
http://www.africanjournalofphilosophy.com
10
first by positivism, then by Wittgenstein “quietism” and the ordinary language philosophy
championed by Austin. Metaphysics languished during the years of occupation. This period
can be called ‘the beginning of dark age’ (dark age for metaphysics).
But the anti-metaphysics biases of this period in the history of analytic philosophy appear, in
retrospect, as an aberration. They were not present during the first phase of the analytic
movement: the revolt against British idealism effected by Russell and Moore. Russell and
Moore, however, were neither dismissive of the traditional problems of metaphysics, nor antitheoretical in the solutions they proposed. “In Moore’s early papers and classic lectures of
1910-11 (which helped to set the agenda for much of Russell’s work)”20, and in Russell’s
classic essays and books from the same period (e.g. The Problems of Philosophy, Mysticism
and Logic, Our Knowledge of the External World), nearly all the traditional problems of
metaphysics are discussed, and positive solutions are defended.
The first analytic philosophers were interested in most of the traditional problems of
metaphysics; the anti-metaphysical period in analytic philosophy was comparatively short; and
there was no lasting revolution in methodology that distinguishes metaphysics in analytic
circles from what one finds in earlier periods and other traditions. Today’s analytic
metaphysicians have the tools of modern logic at their disposal; but, otherwise, it’s pretty much
bussiness –as-usual. For good or ill, the problem they tackle are not significantly different from
those that faced the philosophers of earlier eras; and they defend positions readily identifiable
as variously Platonist, Aristotelian, Thomistic, rationalist, Humean, so on.
Empiricism and logicism are two of the main sources of the origin of analytic philosophy. The
central idea of positivism is that science should use theories as an instrument and should
renounce to seek for explanation. The search for such explanations is a metaphysical enterprise,
and as such, nothing but nonsense. As noticed by Van Fraassen “Empiricist philosophers have
always concentrated on epistemology, the study of knowledge, belief, and opinion, with a
distinct tendency to advocate the importance of opinion”21. Against the ontological concerns
of the metaphysicians, analytic philosophers engaged in epistemological isues. Within analytic
philosophy epistemology seems to remain the only sensible concern.
The explanations so far shows that analytic philosophy objected metaphysics in a way and on
the other hand defended it. Process metaphysics was able to tackle the short comings of
metaphysics which made analytic philosophers reject it. As it was already stated above
concerning the scope of process metaphysics that, process philosophy has full systematic
Logos: African Journal of Philosophy and Studies. Vol. 6, 2023
http://www.africanjournalofphilosophy.com
11
scope: its concern is with the dynamic sense of being as becoming or occurence, the conditions
of spatio-temporal existence, the kinds of dynamic entities, the relationship between mind and
world, and the realization of values in action. Some approaches to process philosophy are
conceived on the grand scale and offer a full-scope metaphysics in the form of a systematic
theory or comprehensive philosophical view. Other approaches, especially more recent ones,
take a more modest approach.
Endnotes.

  1. Dean W. Zimmermann, Prologue: Metaphysics after the Twentieth Century,
    http:/www.wikipedia.org (accessed 20th Jan., 2015).
  2. Dean W. Zimmermann, Prologue: Metaphysics after the Twentieth Century, 1.
  3. A. P. Martinich and David Sosa (ed.), The Blackwell Companion to Analytic
    Philosophy, (Maldan, Mass: Blackwell, 2001), 5.
  4. Stumpf E. Samuel, Philosophy, History and Problems, (New York: McGraw-Hill Inc.,
    1994), 448.
  5. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-philosophicus, (1919), in Stumpf E. Samuel,
    Philosophy, History and Problems, (New York: McGraw-Hill Inc., 1994), 448.
  6. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, (1919), 448
  7. David Hume, Enquiry, in Stumpf E. Samuel, Philosophy, History and Problems, (New
    York: McGraw-Hill Inc., 1994), 448.
  8. G. E. Moore, ‘The Nature of Judgement’, Mind, 8: 176-93, 1899, 182.
  9. P. Hylton, Russell, Idealism and the Emergence of Analytic Philosophy, (Oxford:
    Clarendon Press, 1993).
  10. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. C. K. Ogden and F. P.
    Ramsey, (London: Routledge & Kegen Paul, 1922).
  11. H. O. Mounce, Wittgenstein’s Tractatus: An Introduction, (Chicago: University of
    Chicago Press, 1899).
  12. R. Carnap, The Elimination of Metaphysics Through Logical Analysis of Language
    (1932), in A. J. Ayer, (ed.) Logical Positivism, (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press,
    1959), 77.
  13. en.m.wikipedia.org/process-philosophy (accessed on 29th Jan., 2015).
    Logos: African Journal of Philosophy and Studies. Vol. 6, 2023
    http://www.africanjournalofphilosophy.com
    12
  14. Ilya Prigogine, From Being to Becoming, (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman & Company,
    1980).
  15. Jeremy R. Hustwit, ‘Process Philosophy’ (Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy), 2.
  16. A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality, (New York: Mcmillan, 1929), 58.
  17. A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality, 58.
  18. John B. Cobb and David R. Griffin, Process Theology, An Introduction, (Philadelphia:
    The Westminster Press, 1976).
  19. Plato.stanford.edu/entries/process-philosophy, (accessed on 27th Jan., 2015).
  20. G. E. Moore, Some Main Problems of Philsophy, (London: Allen & Unwin, 1953), 6.
  21. Van Fraassen B., The Empirical Stance, (Yale: Yale University Press, 2002), Xvii.

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *