Patrick O. Aleke, PhD
Department of Philosophy
St. Joseph’s Theological Institute Cedara, KwaZulu Natal, South Africa
Abstract
Heidegger’s description of the human condition in Being and Time seems to be paradoxical.
According to him, Dasein as Being-in-the-world is Being-towards-Death. Death he argues is
Dasein’s way to be and this is a condition which Dasein assumes from the first instance of its
existence. Hence in Heidegger’s view, death is Dasein’s ownmost possibility. In his
existential analysis of Dasein, Heidegger emphasises the centrality of anxiety and death in the
understanding of the human condition. While prima facie, such description might seem
contradictory, Heidegger is quick to differentiate between fear and anxiety, demise and death.
Nonetheless, one would wonder, if death is the way to be Dasein, is the human condition
utterly meaningless? Does finitude exclude the transcendental horizon? Does Heidegger
portray the helplessness of human existence? I shall argue that death as the existential
condition of the human person according to Heidegger does not imply the meaninglessness
and hopelessness of human existential but entails that human mortal condition provokes the
desire of the human spirit for self-realisation and transcendence. So Heidegger’s account of
anxiety and death as characteristic of human existence is not an account of doom and gloom.
Although it might sound controversial, a comprehensive understanding of Heidegger’s
account of the human condition must take into consideration Heidegger’s Christian
foundation and his philosophical formation in mediaeval philosophy. The subtle Christian
influence is manifests itself in Heidegger’s account of guilt and the call of conscience.
Key words: Anxiety, Death, Dasein, Being-in-the-world, Being-towards-death, Human
Condition, Mortality, Falling
Introduction
Martin Heidegger in Being and Time argues that Dasein is the fertile ground for an
exhaustive exploration of the meaning of being (Sein). This is because Dasein is the being
(entity) that most manifests being since it is also very being that raises the question of being
(Sein). Hence, he contends that ‘an analytic of Dasein must remain our first requirement in
the question of Being.’ (Heidegger 1962:37). Such analytic of Dasein according Heidegger
does not amount to an anthropology but fundamental ontology (Heidegger 1999). However,
regardless of Heidegger’s argument, it is arguable that Being and Time is an existential
analysis of the human condition. At the heart of the analysis is the exposition of Dasein as
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Being-towards-death whose primordial state of mind is anxiety since Dasein as Being-in-theworld is a being in time.
In this paper, I shall explore the centrality of anxiety and death in the understanding of the
human condition in Being and Time. I shall argue that although the human mortal condition
seems to be the limit situation in the quest for the self-realisation of Dasein, death (Tod) in
Heidegger’s understand is not an obstacle towardsself-realisation. Rather, death is the
condition that energises Dasein towards authentic existence. Besides, theuncanniness or
anxiety that provokesthe human person to pay attention to his or her existential condition is
not a negative phenomenon but a catalyst that challenges the human person towards authentic
existence and self-actualisation. In other words, finitude is not a support for naturalist
argument but the horizon that provokes the human person towards self-transcendence and the
realisation of the eros of the human spirit(Lonergan 1971:13).
Anxiety and Death in Human Existence
Heidegger in Being and Time argues that anxiety and death are central phenomenafor the
ontological and existential constitution of Dasein. The close relationship between anxiety and
death in the quest for the understanding of the human condition is founded in the fact that
Dasein’s anxiety is not directed to a particular thing, to a this or a that, as it is the case with
fear since anxiety has no object (Heidegger 1962:231). Rather, the human existential angst is
always anxiety in the face of death, that is, an anxiety that arises because of one’s ontological
and existential condition. This implies that Dasein’s anxiety is not seasonal, and death is not
an event. To highlight the non-seasonal character, and the intrinsic relationship between
anxiety and death Heidegger writes:
Thrownness into death reveals itself to Dasein in a more primordial and impressive manner in that
state-of-mind which we have called “anxiety”.Anxiety in the face of death is anxiety ‘in the face of’
that potentiality-for-Being which is one’s ownmost, non-relational, and not to be
outstripped…Anxiety in the face of death must not be confused with fear in the face of one’s demise.
This anxiety is not an accident or random mood of “weakness” in some individual; but, as a basic
state-of-mind of Dasein it amounts to the disclosedness of the fact that Dasein exists as thrown Being
towards its end (1962:295).
Prima facie, it would seem that Heidegger’s understanding or articulation of anxiety and
death is negative. Hence some commentators like Hubert L. Dreyfus and Jane Rubin have
chosen such interpretation.According to them, anxiety results from ‘the realization that
[one’s] life has no“ultimate meaning”’ (Blattner 2006:161, Dreyfus 1990:180-181).However,
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Heidegger’s understanding of anxiety and death is different from ordinary everyday use of
the terms especially ashe distinguishes anxiety and death from fear and demise respectively.It
is pertinent therefore that his understanding of the concepts be further explored.
Heidegger’s Conception of Anxiety
What then is anxiety according to Heidegger?The first point to be made when considering
Heidegger’s understanding of anxiety is that his conception is not the same as it is used in
common everyday use. In common understanding, there is the tendency to equate or confuse
anxiety with fear. Hence it is common hear a student say: I am anxious about the final
examination. Anxiety is sometimes also confused with depression or nervousness. Thus ‘the
expression “anxiety disorder” is common’ among psychologists (Aleke 2015:26).The fact
thatthe common understanding of anxiety is marked with the tendency to confuse the concept
with other concepts like fear or nervousness is manifest in the definition of anxiety in the
Oxford Advanced Learners Dictionary. It defines anxiety as ‘the state of feeling nervous or
worried that something bad is going to happen’ (2010:55). From this definition, it could be
inferred that everyday understanding of anxiety is ambiguous.The consequence of the
ambiguous nature of the common understanding of the term anxiety is the tendency to
misunderstand and so misinterpret Heidegger’s conception of anxiety regardless of the fact
that he is clear that anxiety and fear are not interchangeable since fear always has an objectthat which threatens- while anxiety has no specific object. He argues his position thus:
That in the face of which one has anxiety is not an entity within-the-world. Thus it is essentially
incapable of having an involvement. This threatening does not have the character of a definite
detrimentality which reaches what is threatened, and which reaches it with definite regard to a
special factical potentiality-for-Being. That in the face of which one is anxious is completely
indefinite. Not only does this indefiniteness leave factically undecided which entity within-theworld is threatening us, but it also tells us that entities within-the-world are not ‘relevant’at all.
Nothing which is ready-to-hand and present-at-hand within the world functions as that in the face
of which anxiety is anxious (Heidegger 1962:231).
If the conception of anxiety according Heidegger is not the common understanding since it is
not synonymous with fear because of its lack of specific object, what then is anxiety
according to Heidegger? In his view, anxiety is Dasein’s basic state-of-mind that discloses to
itits ontological and existential condition (1962:228-231). In other words, it is the mood that
accompanies one’s realisation that one is a Being-in-the-world and as Being-in-the-world a
Being-toward-death. Because anxiety discloses to Dasein its existential condition as Beingin-the-world, Heidegger argues: ‘That in the face of which one has anxiety is Being-in-the-
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world itself’(1962:295). Although Heidegger makes efforts to be consistent in maintaining
that anxiety is a vital existential mood. His description of anxiety is sometimesparadoxical
(not contradictory). For instance, despite his contention that anxiety unlike fear has no object,
he sometimes seemsto argue that anxiety has an object though an indefinite object. He writes:
‘Anxiety is not only anxiety in the face of something, but, as a state-of-mind, it is also anxiety
about something. That which anxiety is profoundly anxious [sichabängstet] about is not a
definite kind of Being for Dasein or a definite possibility’(1962:232).
The paradoxical description of anxiety leads some commentatorsto interpret Heidegger’s
notion of anxiety in a negative manner. Dreyfus gives suchinterpretation of anxiety. He
affirms:
Anxiety is thus the disclosure accompanying a Dasein’s preontological sense that it is not the
source of meanings it uses to understand itself; that the public world makes no intrinsic sense for it
and would go on whether a particular Dasein existed or not. In anxiety Dasein discovers that it has
no meaning or content of its own; nothing individualizes it but its empty thrownness (1994:180).
While there is no difficulty in agreeing with Dreyfus that in anxiety Dasein discovers ‘that it
is not the source of meanings it uses to understand itself’, it is difficult to infer from that that
such discovery entails that Dasein ‘has no meaning or content of its own’. To be the source of
meanings is one thing and to have no meaning is another. So ‘there is neither logical nor
existential-ontological foundation to conclude that Dasein has no meaning of its own just
because it is not the source of the meaning’ that it uses to understand itself (Aleke 2015:27).
Regardless of the paradoxical nature of Heidegger’s articulation of anxiety, it is against the
spirit of Heidegger’s conception to interpret his understanding of anxiety purely in negative
terms. Anxiety according to Heidegger does not only have disclosing function, it also has the
function of bringing Dasein back from the state of fallenness, that is, back from ‘its
absorption in the ‘world’ to authentic existence (Heidegger 1962:233). When the disclosing
and bringing back functions of anxiety are taken into consideration, it becomes manifest that
Heideggerian anxiety cannot be reduced to a negative interpretation – Dasein’s discovering of
its meaningless. Even when ‘anxiety individualizes Dasein…[and brings] Dasein face to face
with its world as world, and thus brings it face to face with itself as Being-in-the-world’
(1962:233) it does not imply that it has pronounced the death sentence that Dasein has no
meaning. Rather what anxiety does in disclosing the ontological and existential condition of
the human person is that itacts as the catalyst which provokes the human person to come to
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the awareness of its true identity. ‘That is to say that in anxiety, Dasein realises that its core
meaning does not arise from its social contacts and relationships, family ties, social position
and status. Anxiety discloses to Dasein that as a Being-in-the-world, it is a Being-towardsdeath; therefore, it is in its attitude toward its death that it understands its [Dasein’s] core
meaning’ (Aleke 2015:27). Piotr Hoffman’s interpretation of Heidegger’s anxiety
acknowledges its functionas a catalyst. He writes: ‘[…] For my first-person sense of death
establishes my life not only as a totality, but also as uniquely mine – that is, not as an
intersection of social and natural roles and functions that I share, or may share, with others’
(1993:198).
If it is problematic to interpret anxiety in purely negative terms (or even purely as positive),
as I contend, how then could Heidegger’s conception be interpreted in order to avoid any
reductionist interpretation? Rather than approaching anxiety in a positive or negative
mentality, its interpretation could be considered from other perspective, for instance,
psychological and existential-hermeneutical perspectives. William Blattner’s interpretation
‘seems to be from a psychological perspective’. This is because he contends ‘that “anxiety”
as used by Heidegger is similar to depression’ (Aleke 2015:29, Blattner 2006:141-142). Such
interpretation is important because it acknowledges ‘the “crippling” and paralyzing effects
that accompany anxiety’ since it sometimes have stifling effect on the human person just as
depression does (2015:29). However, there is still danger of viewing the psychological
interpretation as purely negative if Heideggerian anxiety is identified with depression. Hence,
I prefer an existential-hermeneutical perspective in which anxiety is considered to be ‘similar
to the phenomenon of “crisis” which serves as kairos – time of grace – because it provokes
Dasein to make a fundamental choice of accepting death as its ownmost possibility or of
living in denial of the existential-ontological reality of death’ (2015:29). In this sense, the
primary function of anxiety is revelational in that it discloses to the human person his or her
existential condition and challenges it to live in accordancewith his or her nature and
vocation.
Heidegger’s Concept of Death
If the disclosing character of anxiety lies in provoking the human person to realise that as
Being-in-the-world, it is a Being-towards-death, what does death mean to Heidegger? Two
points are important to note when considering Heidegger’s understanding of death. Firstly,
his conception of death is not equivalent to the ordinary everyday use of the term. Secondly,
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he presents his conception of death in a paradoxical manner. The paradox arises because even
though Heidegger argues that death is not an event, sometimes he gives the impression that it
is. For instance,he affirms at the same time that: ‘Death is a way to be, which Dasein takes
over as soon as it is’ (1962:289); and that: ‘Dasein’s death is the possibility of no-longer
being-able-to-be-there’ (1962:294). These two affirmations seem contradictory. This results
in the tendency to equate Heidegger’s concept of death with biological end.
Regarding the first point, in order to avoid the reduction of his concept of death to everyday
understanding Heidegger differentiates perishing (Verenden) and demise (Ableben) from
death (Tod). According to him, perishing is the cessation of living organisms expect for
Dasein, since in his view Dasein ‘does not simply perish’ and ‘never perishes’ (Heidegger
1962:291). In other words, perishing is the biological end of living things. He affirms: ‘In our
terminology the ending of anything that is alive is denoted as “perishing” [Verenden]’
(1962:284). Although Heidegger contends that Dasein does not simply perish, it does have its
biological end which is an event at the end of its life. This is what Heidegger calls demise
Ableben.
In distinguishing between perishing, demise and death, Heidegger’s intention is to point out
that his understanding of death is not identical with the biological end. Hence he argues that
while perishing and demise are events, death (just like dying [Sterben]) is a phenomenon.
Because death is an existential phenomenon and not an event, he argues that: ‘Death is a way
to be, which Dasein takes over as soon as it is’ (1962:289). In order to further clarify that
death according to him is not an event and so should not be interpreted in a reductive manner,
Heidegger asserts that: ‘Death is Dasein’s ownmost possibility. Being towards this possibility
discloses to Dasein itsownmost potentiality-for-Being, in which its very Being is the issue.
Here it can become manifest to Dasein that in this distinctive possibility of its ownself, it has
been wrenched away from the “they” das Man
Since Heidegger’s exposition of death shows that it is not equivalent biological end but an
existential phenomenon, what exactly is death in simple terms? Heidegger’s concept of death
can simply be understood as human mortal condition, that is, the existential condition in
which human existential project can be defined and situated. In other words, death as
Dasein’s way to be highlights the limits of its ontological constitution as being-in-time. It is
when death is understood as human mortal condition or mortality and not as demise, that the
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relation between anxiety and death in Heidegger is better explained. In this sense, anxiety
reveals to the human person that its existence is marked by limitedness of time, since it is
finite or mortal; and as such there is always an urgent need for it to decide to live
authentically or to live inauthentically by absorbing oneself in the world and thus drowning
oneself in the they (Das Man). It is in this light that Heidegger argues: ‘Anxiety makes
manifest in Dasein its Being towards its own potentiality-for-Being – that is, its Being-free
for the freedom for choosing itself and taking hold of itself’ (1962:232).Anxiety and death
then are not an obstacle or limit situation for the human person. They do not manifest the
closing down of possibilities for Dasein. They are primarily the horizon for the selfactualisation or rather the realisation of the human person who though finite yearns for the
transcendent.Judith Wolfe (2013) seems to interpret human condition in Being and Time in
terms of transcendental yearning. She argues: ‘At its simplest, Heidegger’s account in Being
and Time is “eschatological” because it envisions the possibility of authentic existence as
dependent on a certain (existential) relation to one’s future’ (2013:118).
It is arguable whether Heidegger’s exposition of anxiety and death permits one to interpret
them in terms of self-realisation and human yearning for the transcendent. A commentator of
Heidegger who understands death as a limit situation would argue that such interpretation is
nothing but putting words into the mouth of Heidegger. However, a careful reading and study
Heidegger’s analysis of anticipation makes the interpretation of anxiety and death within the
context for the yearning for the transcendent possible. He writes:
Anticipation discloses to existence that its uttermost possibility lies in giving itself up, and
thus it shatters all one’s tenaciousness to whatever existence one has reached. In
anticipation, Dasein guards itself againstfalling back behind itself, or behind the
potentiality-for-Being which it has understood. It guards itself against ‘becoming too old
for its victories’ (Nietzsche) (1962:308).
So one can argue that it is not anxiety and death that stifles and restricts human projections.
In other words, anxiety and death are not condemnation for Dasein, it is rather the rejection or
denial of the centrality of anxiety and death in the human existential-ontological constitution,
that is, the fallenness and fleeing of Dasein, that leads to hopelessness or even
meaninglessness of human existence. It is because of detrimental character of the fallen state
that anxiety has the function of disclosing to Dasein its lostnessin the they (Das Man), and
thus brings it back from inauthentic to authentic existence. The disclosing and bringing back
functions mark the connection between anxiety and anticipation since ‘anticipation reveals to
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Dasein its lostness in the they-self, and brings it face to face with the possibility of being
itself, primarily unsupported by concernful solicitude, but of being itself, rather, in an
impassioned freedom towards death―a freedom which has been realised from the Illusions
of the “they”, and which is factical, certain of itself, and anxious’(1962:311).
It is because of the inescapability of the human mortal condition, that Heidegger argues that
‘death reveals itself as that possibility which is one’s owmost, which is non-relational, and
which is not to be outstripped [unüberholbare]’ (1962:294).
It is worth noting that when Heidegger says that death is a possibility or even the ownmost
possibility of Dasein, he refers to what he calls existential and not logical possibility – which
he describes as the merely possible. He contends that while logical possibility ‘signifies what
is not yet actual and what is not at any time necessary’ (1962:183),existential possibility on
the other founded on actuality. Because Dasein’s possibility is not a logical possibility, he
concludes that existential possibility ‘is the most primordial and ultimate positive way in
which Dasein is characterized ontologically’ (1962:183).
From our exploration so far, one could argue that Heidegger’s existential analysis of the
human condition in Being and Time is not based on purely philosophical investigation. It is
influenced by some latent theological underpinning. In other words, Heidegger’s exposition
is not purely a philosophical anthropology but a philosophico-theological anthropology. The
theological or Christian anthropological influence in Heidegger’s exposition is manifest in
some of the key terms – death, falling, guilt, anticipation and call of conscience – that he
employs in his exposition.
The Key to an Adequate Understanding of the Human Condition in Early Heidegger
The key to an exhaustive understanding of Heidegger’s exposition of the human conditionis
his theological background which is exemplified by his catholic Christian identity and his
initial formation in theology as a candidate for the catholic priesthood. It would be naïve to
underestimate the influence of Heidegger’s Christian identity in his existential analysis of the
human condition. Heidegger’s concept of falling as one’s fleeing from the self and authentic
existence in order to absorb oneself in the world of the they [Das Man] is loaded with the
biblical notion of the fall and Christian concept of sin. It is not by coincidence that
Heidegger’s articulation of falling is similar to concept of sin or fall as symbolically
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exemplified with the biblical notion of the fall as described in the aetiological account of the
fall of Adam and Eve. In fact, Heidegger’s characterisation of falling has an undertone of
Christian description of sin. In his articulation he affirms that ‘temptation, tranquillization,
and alienation are distinguishing marks of the kind of Being called “falling”. As falling,
everyday Being-towards-death is a constant fleeing in the face of death. Being-towards-theend has the mode of evasion in the face of it―giving new explanations for it, understanding it
inauthentically, and concealing it’ (1962:298).A critical look at the distinguishing marks of
falling shows a close parallel between Heidegger’s conception of falling and the Christian
notion of sin. The parallel can be summarized thus: Just as temptation leads to sin and the
consequence of sinning is alienation, so also temptation leads to falling and consequently
Dasein is alienated from itself and from authentic existence.
The Christian theological nuance in Heidegger’s exposition of the human condition is not
only limited to the parallel between sin and falling but also manifest in the roleof the call of
conscience and guiltwhen one is the fallen state. He articulates the call of conscience and its
role thus:
Conscience give us ‘something’ to understand; it discloses. By characterizing this
phenomenon formally in this way, we find ourselves enjoined to take it back to the
disclosedness of Dasein. This disclosedness, as a basic state of that entity which we
ourselves are, is constituted by state-of-mind, understanding, falling, and discourse. If we
analyse conscience more penetratingly, it is revealed as a call [Ruf]. Calling is a mode of
discourse. The call of conscience has the character of an appeal to Dasein by calling it to
its ownmost potentiality-for-Being-its-Self; and this is done by way of summoning it to its
ownmost Being-guilty (1962:314).
Although Heidegger maintains that his understanding of conscience is different from
common sense understanding (1962:314), there is similarity between his conception and the
Christian understanding of moral conscience. For instance, the Catechism of the Catholic
Church states: ‘It important for every person to be sufficiently present to himself in order to
hear and follow the voice of his conscience. This requirement of interiority is all the more
necessary as life often distracts us from any reflection, self-examination or introspection’
(CCC 1779). The centrality self-presence or interiority whenconscience and its call is the
issue is also highlighted by Heidegger: ‘If Dasein is to be able to get brought back from [the]
lostness of failing to hear itself, and if this is to be done through itself, then it must first be
able find itself―to find itself as something which has failed to hear itself, and which fails to
hear in that it listens away to the “they”’ (1962:215-316).
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Should one consider the Christian nuances in Heidegger’s conception of falling and
conscience a mere coincidence? I argue that it would be naïve to consider them as a
merecoincidence. The origin of parallel between Heidegger’s analysis of human condition
and Christian doctrine is Heidegger’s Christian identity and his knowledge of Mediaeval
philosophy. Of course, a possible objection is that it could be argued that tracing the
similarities between Heidegger’s exposition of the human condition and Christian
anthropology to Heidegger’s Christian faith is a stretched analysis or explanation. However,
to ignore the similarities in the name coincidence would be naïve and a betrayal to the “pure”,
‘unrestricted, detached and disinterested desire to know’ (Lonergan 1992:404).
Conclusion
In this paper, I have argued that Heidegger’s conception of anxiety and death are
indispensable for the understanding of the human condition in Being and Time. This is
because Dasein as a Being-in-the-world is a being in time and as such Being-towards-death.
Hence what orientates human existence is one’s understanding of human mortal condition.
Nonetheless, finitude in itself does not imply the meaninglessness of human existence. In
fact, it does not lend credence to the naturalist argument that there is no transcendental
horizon. If the mortal condition of the human person were a guarantee that there should not
be a projection towards the future, Dasein would not have been anxious in the face of death.It
is when anxiety in the face of death is reduced to fear of demise that Heidegger’s analysis is
used as a support for denial of the transcendental dimension. On the contrary, it is the
transcendental yearning that gives rise to anxiety in the face of death.
A fuller appreciation of Heidegger analysis of the human condition is possible when one goes
beyond mere phenomenological analysis and acknowledges the role that Heidegger’s
Christian faith plays in his understanding of the human condition. The similarity between
Heidegger’s concept of falling and Christian understanding of sin (and biblical fall) and the
role of conscience and guilt when one is in the states of falling and sin are clear indications of
the Christian foundation of Heidegger’s conception of the human condition.
So if Heidegger’s exposition of human condition is a fundamental ontology and not just
anthropological analysis as he argues, then his fundamental ontology is ontotheological. In
that light, the analysis of anxiety and death in Early Heidegger should not be seen an
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investigation into the meaninglessness of human existence because of human finitude but it
must be placed within the context of the “mystery of being” (Marcel 1960).
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